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Abstract
In this paper we study the verification of parameterised multi-agent system (MASs),
and in particular the task of verifying whether unwanted states, characterised as a given
state formula, are reachable in a given MAS, i.e., whether the MAS is unsafe. The MAS
is parameterised and the model only describes the finite set of possible agent templates,
while the actual number of concrete agent instances for each template is unbounded and
cannot be foreseen. This makes the state-space infinite. As safety may of course depend
on the number of agent instances in the system, the verification result must be correct
irrespective of such number. We solve this problem via infinite-state model checking based
on satisfiability modulo theories (SMT), relying on the theory of array-based systems: we
present parameterised MASs as particular array-based systems, under two execution se-
mantics for the parameterised MAS, which we call concurrent and interleaved. We prove
our decidability results under these assumptions and illustrate our implementation ap-
proach, called SAFE: the Swarm Safety Detector, based on the third-party model checker
MCMT, which we evaluate experimentally. Finally, we discuss how this approach lends
itself to richer parameterised and data-aware MAS settings beyond the state-of-the-art
solutions in the literature, which we leave as future work.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems (MASs) are commonly used in many complex, real-life domains, so it has
become crucial to be able to verify such systems against given specifications. This typically
amounts to check the existence of execution strategies for the achievement of given goals
or to compute counterexamples as evidence of points of potential failure. Model checking
[20] is one of the most common approaches to verification of MASs, often with a focus on
strategic abilities [11]. However, a common limitation in this literature is the assumption
that the system is finite-state and fully specified, which in many applications requires to
propositionalize crucial system features. Other approaches have thus tackled the verification
of MASs in settings that are intrinsically infinite-state [23], for which explicit model-checking
techniques cannot be used off-the-shelf. These are the settings in which either some sort
of data component is present or where the concrete component instances of the MAS are
not explicitly listed beforehand. Our work falls into the latter category, that is the one of
verification of parameterised MASs (PMASs), recognised as a key reasoning task and addressed
by a growing literature [30, 10, 31, 23, 21]. In PMASs, the number of agents is unbounded
and unknown, so that possibly infinite concrete MASs need to be considered: the task is to
check whether the specification is met by any (or all) concrete MAS that adheres to some
behavioural structure (typically a set of agent templates), without fixing the number of actual
agents a priori. Here, we focus on checking safety, namely that no state satisfying a state
formula (existentially quantifying on agent instances) is reachable for any number of agent
instances. E.g., checking that there will never be two agents in the restricted area. Note that
this differs from checking that a strategy (for some agent) exists to prevent unsafe states.
Safety checking (and reachability) is a crucial property of MASs as well as finite and infinite
dynamic systems, with a long-standing tradition (e.g., [3]). Applications are numeorous, from
the verification of properties of swarms to industry 4.0 [7], where one wants to check that
instances of a product family will be manufacturable by robots from a fixed model catalogue.
In this paper we present our verification technique based on an SMT [8] approach for
array-based systems [26, 27, 6, 5, 15, 19], characterising its soundness and completeness (and
decidability of the task) under different assumptions. We detail our solution and comment on
its implementation in the well-established SMT-based model-checker MCMT [28]. As future
work, we comment on how this framework lends itself to accommodate the other source of
infinity mentioned above, i.e. the data dimension.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state the contributions
of this work and relate our results to the previous literature on parameterised verification
and, in particular, verification of parameterised multi-agent systems. Then, in Section 3 we
provide the definition of Parameterized MAS (PMAS) and we present two different semantics
for PMASs, i.e. the concurrent and the interleaved ones: this distinction gives rise to two
corresponding classes of PMASs. In Section 3.2.3 the (un)safety checking problem for PMASs
is introduced; all the results of the paper will focus on solving this kind of verification task.
Then, in Section 4 we give a formal encoding of PMASs into the array-based systems formal-
ism: this translation depends on the specific semantics employed, hence two distinct encodings
for interleaved and concurrent PMASs are provided. In Section 5 we describe our symbolic
variant of backward search, i.e. the verification procedure we employ to assess (un)safety of
PMASs, and we discuss its soundness and completeness. In Section B we also device an addi-
tional (sufficient) syntactic condition to impose to PMASs in order to guarantee termination of
backward search, and hence the decidability of the verification problem. Finally, in Section 6
3
2 RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTION
we present and evaluate experimentally our user-interface tool, called SAFE, illustrating the
implementation of our approach and how it is based on the state-of-the-art MCMT model
checker. We conclude and discuss future work in Section 8.
First, we introduce our running example (a further example will be discussed in Section 7).
Example scenario. Imagine a robotic swarm attacking a defence position, protected by
a robot cannon. There are only two possible paths to reach the position: an attacker must
first move to waypoint A or B, then move again to reach the target. Attackers can only move
to either waypoint if the paths to A or B are not covered in snow, and similarly for reaching
the target. The snow condition is not known in advance. The defensive cannon can target
either waypoint with a blast or with an EMP pulse. The cannon program is so that a blast
can only be fired if there are robots in that waypoint, and at least one robot under fire is hit.
If instead the EMP pulse is directed towards A or B, no robot can move there. The cannon
can use either the blast or activate the pulse at the same time but, while the EMP is active,
the cannon can continue firing blasts. The EMP can cover either A or B, not both. The
number of attackers is not known.
It appears that, even if all paths are free of snow, an effective defensive plan exists: at the
beginning, use the pulse (say against A); let the enemy robots make their moves to B (the
pulse ramains active on A), then use the blast against B to destroy robots there. Whenever
further attackers move to B, use again the blast, otherwise wait. If one path is not viable the
plan is even simpler. Question: does this strategy work? Answer: only if the blast destroys
all robots in the waypoint against which it is fired. Q: if blasts do not hit all robots under
fire, how many attackers may have a chance of reaching the target? A: at least two, if they
move to the waypoint B together, since blasts always hit at least one robot. Q: is any attack
plan for at least two robots guaranteed to work? A: no. This scenario is trivial, however a
complex network of waypoints or cannons capable of targeting multiple waypoints can make
this arbitrarily complex, also given that the snow conditions cannot be foreseen, requiring
to reason by cases. If “playing” as attackers, computing an attack plan (and for how many
robots) that has chances against any number of cannons is even more complex.
In this paper we tackle this type of scenarios, showing how they can be modelled and
solved, but also that our solution technique is powerful enough to be used to account for a
number of features that cannot be included in this preliminary work, that is, the inclusion of
full fledged relational database storing public and private agent data information with read
and write access.
2 Related Work and Contribution
The related work is constituted by the literature on parameterised verification [10] and more
specifically verification of PMASs.
2.1 Parameterized verification
The literature on parameterized verification is related but nonetheless distinct from our ap-
proach, for al least two reasons. First, we are tackling verification of parameterised PMASs,
tightly relating our decidability results with the assumed MAS execution semantics and justi-
fying our modeling choices based on that setting. Second, as summarized in [10], decidability
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results for these systems are based on reduction to finite-state model checking via abstrac-
tion [33, 29], cutoff computations (i.e. a bound on the number of instances that need to be
verified [22]) or by proving that they can be represented as well-structured transition systems
[24, 3]. However, our technique is not based on (predicate and counter) abstractions, cutoffs
or reductions to finite-state model checking. Instead, our theoretical results are based on
the model-theoretic framework of ABS [27, 19] and can be seen as a declarative, first-order
counterpart of theories of well-structured transition systems for which compatible results are
known in the community (see, e.g., [3, 10]). Finally, as we argue in the next section, the appli-
cation of our results is novel, effective and yields decidability results of direct and immediate
applicability to a clear class of PMASs.
2.2 PMAS verification
Regarding verification of PMASs, the closest related work is that on parameterised MAS
[30, 31, 9] and open MAS [21, 32]. In [21, 32], the authors study MASs where agents can
join and leave dynamically. As in our work, agents are characterised by a type and their
number is not bounded. Types in [21] are akin to ours, although their evolution is action-
nondeterministic due on observations. [21] adopts synchronous composition operations over
automata on infinite words and their procedure can verify strategic abilities for LTL goals by
reduction to synthesis. Notwithstanding the fact that we only look at safety (reachability),
a mechanism for joining/leaving the system can be captured natively in our formalization of
PMAS. A similar framework is in [32], sharing the same model of [30] and related papers, with
agent templates similar to those considered here. Compared with that work, we restrict to
safety checking instead of considering the more general task of model checking specifications
in modal logics or strategic abilities. Safety checking (and, conversely, reachability analysis) is
a crucial task with a long tradition in AI and in the field of reasoning about actions. In what
follows, we note some comparison points, highlighting the value and novelty of our approach
for checking safety.
• In the theory. In this paper we present a verification technique based on an SMT [8]
approach for ABS [26, 27, 6, 5, 15], characterising its soundness and completeness. This is a
very well-understood SMT-based theory for which a number of results of practical applicability
already exist, and research is active [27, 15, 28, 12, 16, 18, 13, 19, 14, 25, 17]. This is the first
paper to establish a formal connection between verification of PMASs and the long-standing
tradition of SMT-based model checking for ABS. Also, leveraging SMT-techniques makes the
framework directly extendible in multiple directions. For example, we only used the empty
theory and EUF (the theory of uninterpreted symbols): these theories are customary in the
SMT literature, and are sufficient for the scope of this paper, since here we deal with first-order
relations that are uninterpreted (i.e. not interpreted in any specific domain). Therefore, more
involved theories are not used, but this possibility is readily available thanks to our work:
indeed, our formalism can be immediately adapted to the case of richer theories that can be
employed to impose additional constraints on the value domains of interest. We can easily
introduce theories constraining agent data. E.g., elements can be retrieved from relational
databases (both shared or private) with constraints such as key dependencies, in the line
with [15, 14, 19]. On this, it is our aim to combine this framework with the RAS formalism
in [15, 19], in order to equip a PMAS with relational data read/written by agents. Adding
theories, data-aware extensions, restricted arithmetics, cardinality constraints, are all now
concretely usable directions for checking safety of PMASs.
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• In the execution semantics. In [30], authors consider (i) asynchronous actions and
synchronization between the environment and (ii) one agent, (iii) all agents of a given tem-
plate, (iv) all agents, (v) two agents of different templates. All these are possible in our
framework as it is, although we explicitly describe only (i), (ii), (iii). Further execution
semantics can be trivially reconstructed, based on these.
• In the decidability guarantees. Even though our objective is not that of recon-
structing known frameworks, it is useful to note that our results are compatible but not easily
comparable with the literature on PMASs verification. The results in [30] depend on the com-
binations of actions as above: it is decidable only for PMAS where synchronization actions
as in (i), (iii), (iv) are used (called SFE), while decidability depends in different ways on the
existence of a cutoff for PMASs with either (i), (ii), (v) (called SMR) or (i), (ii), (iv) (called
SGS). The work in [31] extends the cutoff results to the infinite state templates for SGS (while,
to the best of our knowledge, the same extension is not available for SMR). As our theory is
not restricted in any way to finite dimensions, our results extend to that setting as well (see
point “In the data dimension" below). For SMR and SGS their procedure requires to check
the existence of a cutoff; if it exists, the outcome is correct, otherwise the procedure halts
with no result. However, the existence of a cutoff depends on the existence of a simulation
property (between the agent templates and the environment) to be checked on the abstracted
system, which has to be computed first. This implies (see Def. 5.2), that in the general case
their approach is sound, not complete and terminates, and is also complete for a given class
of PMASs if the existence of cutoffs is guaranteed for that class (such as SFE, but not the
whole SMR and SGS).
Conversely, our technique does not require cutoffs nor any notion alike: we can directly
prove soundness and completeness for SMR and SGS (see Thm. 5.4), while termination (thus a
complete decision procedure) can be directly guaranteed by a syntactic property of the action
guards and of the goal formula, which we call locality in Section B. Hence for SMR they cannot
provide guarantees without a simulation test or when its result is false, while we can directly
characterise the class of problems for which ours is a decision procedure.
• In the data dimension. Although we assume finite local states and actions (as in [30]
but not in [9]), our aim is a clear separation between the sources of infiniteness: our theory
allows for a data-aware extension for which solid results in the verification literature on ABS
exist [15, 19]. This allows finite action signatures with infinite number of possible parameter
values, and also to write infinite data values on a read/write data storage. This will give
agents infinite possible contexts and action instances, in a framework natively supporting a
data dimension.
• In the implementation. Finally, a general purpose model checker (MCMT [28]) is
available for checking safety of PMASs: our contribution is directly operational and only
requires a textual counterpart of the encoding we propose in Sec. 4.1 (see Sec. 6). Such
textual representation, representing a PMAS as an array-based system, can be directly given
as input file to MCMT. Moreover, since both the modelling of PMASs and their translations as
textual files for MCMT proves to be particularly laborious, we have made available an intuitive
web tool that serves as user interface for modelling and translating PMASs into array-based
systems, using the syntax required by MCMT. Such tool, called SAFE: the Swarm Safety
Detector, is illustrated in Section 6.2 and is available at [2].
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3 PMASs: parameterised MAS
In this section we introduce our representation of PMASs and two alternative execution se-
mantics.
We consider a set Θ of (semantic) data types, used for variables. Each type θ ∈ Θ comes
with a (possibly infinite) domain ∆θ, and a type-wise equality operator =θ. For instance,
types are reals, integers, booleans, etc. We simply write = when the type is clear. We also
consider a set R of relations over types in Θ, which we treat as uninterpreted relations (i.e.
simple relation symbols). These relations are used to model background information in the
MAS but are never updated during its execution, constituting a read-only component. E.g.,
the snow condition in the scenario can be modelled via these relations, as we will show. We
consider the usual notion of FO interpretations I = (∆I , ·I) with ∆I = ⋃Θ ∆θ and ·I is an
FOL interpretation function for symbols in R.
Definition 3.1. An agent template is a tuple T = 〈ID, L, l0, V, type, val ,Aloc ,Asyn , P, δ〉
composed of:
• an infinite set ID of unique agent identifiers of sort id;
• a finite set L of local states, with initial state l0 ∈ L;
• a finite set V of local (i.e., internal) agent state variables;
• a variable-type assignment type : V 7→ Θ;
• a variable assignment val : L × V 7→ ⋃Θ ∆θ returning their current values, with
val(l, v) ∈ ∆θ for θ = type(v);
• a non-empty, finite set of action symbols A .= Aloc ∪Asyn (described later), with Aloc ∩
Asyn = ∅;
• a protocol function specifying the conditions under which each action is executable. It
is a function P : A 7→ Ψ, where Ψ are agent formulae, defined in the next section, that
allow to “query” the current state of the whole MAS;
• a transition function δ : L × A 7→ L, describing how the local state is affected by the
execution of an action α: the template moves from a state l to a state l′ iff δ(l, α) = l′,
also denoted l α−→ l′. We assume δ to be total.
An environment template is a special agent template Te with fixed identifier (i.e.,
ID = {e}): there is exactly one environment. Intuitively, a (concrete) agent is a triple
composed of an agent id, its template and its current local state. Analogously, a (concrete)
environment is a pair consisting of the template Te and its current state (again, e is a
constant).
Remark. Please note that the templates are defined as in Definition 3.1 for consistency
with relevant literature and for the sake of clarity, although such an explicit finite-state repre-
sentation, although clearly possible, is often impractical for real-world implementations. An
equivalent representation, which however would require a more tedious formalization, is so
that the transition function δ is given implicitly, rather than explicitly, by specifying pre-
and post-conditions of actions, based on the current variable assignment. This would allow
to specify that an action is executable if and only if a boolean formula on local variables,
mentioning positive and negated variable conditions, is currently satisfied. Accordingly, local
states would not be explicit: the set L would be implicitly defined as a finite subset of possible
assignments of variables. This is the representation we use in our implementation. As said,
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loc=init
destroyed=false
loc=A
destroyed=false
loc=B
destroyed=false
loc=target
destroyed=false
loc=A
destroyed=true
loc=target
destroyed=false
loc=B
destroyed=true
gotoA
gotoB
gotoT
blastA
gotoT
blastB
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop nop
nop
pulse-loc=nil
pulse-loc=A
pulse-loc=B
pulseA
pulseB
nop
blastA, blastB
nop
blastA, blastB
nop
blastA, blastB
pulseA pulseB
Figure 1: A depiction of the templates Tatt (left) and Te (right). The label next to each local
state l (represented as a state) specifies the value val(l, v) of each variable v ∈ V . More
transitions could be trivially included in Tatt , but we keep this example minimal.
however, for the technical development that follows, the representation used in Definition 3.1
is more convenient.
Example. We use a template Tatt for robots, with variables loc (enumeration [init,A, B,target])
and destroyed (boolean). The first variable is used for storing an agent’s location, whereas
the latter is for specifying whether the agent is destroyed and cannot move anymore. The
actions are gotoA, gotoB and gotoT for representing the actions of moving to waypoints (from the
initial location) and to the target (from either waypoint), plus additional actions blastA, blastB
representing the action of “being destroyed” by a shot fired at position A or B, respectively.
For instance, a transition l gotoA−−−→ l′ exists in δ for this template when val(l, loc) = init and
val(l, destroyed) = false, and the resulting local state l′ is such that val(l′, loc) = A (plus further
assignments for inertia). Other actions are defined in a similar manner. Figure 1 depicts this
template, represented as a labelled finite-state system. The cannon is modeled as (part of) the
environment, whose template Te has actions pulseA,pulseB,blastA,blastB and variables pulse-loc
(enumeration [A, B, nil]). The former is used to store the location (waypoint A or B) towards
which the pulse is currently directed.
The snow is captured by a binary relation on locations (e.g. Snow(init,A)). Note that
relations inR are common to the whole MAS, and in general their interpretation is unbounded.
Protocols are given later.
Let {T1, . . . , Tn, Te} be a set of agent (and environment) templates, with Tt = 〈IDt, Lt, l0t ,
Vt, typet, val t,Aloct ,Asyn , Pt, δt〉 for t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e}. We denote a concrete agent of type Tt,
t ∈ [1, n], and id j by writing 〈j, lj〉t, and similarly we denote the concrete environment by
〈e, le〉e. We also denote a vector of k such concrete agents of type Tt as 〈~I, ~L〉t, where ~I ∈ IDkt
and ~L ∈ Lkt are vectors of ids and local states, respectively. Importantly, we assume that
agent ids are unique and template variables disjoint, i.e., IDt ∩ IDt′ = ∅ and Vt ∩ Vt′ = ∅ for
t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , n, e}, t 6= t′.
A PMAS is a tuple M = 〈{T1, . . . , Tn}, Te,R〉 with a set of n agent templates, one
environment template and the relations. Note that a PMAS specifies the initial local state
of all agents for each template, but does not specify how many concrete agents exist for each
template. A snapshot is a tuple g = 〈{〈~I1, ~L1〉1, . . . , 〈~In, ~Ln〉n}, 〈e, le〉e〉, which thus identifies
the number of agent instances (the size of each ~It, t ∈ [1, n], may differ). A snapshot is initial
iff all agents are in their initial local state. Clearly, infinite possible initial snapshots exist,
since the number of concrete agents for each template is unbounded and not known a priori.
As shorthand, we denote the local state lj of agent 〈j, lj〉t in snapshot g as g.j, thus writing
〈j, g.j〉t.
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3.1 Agent formulae
Here we define the agent formulae used for protocols in Def. 3.1 as quantifier-free formulae
ψ(j, self, e, v) where j are the free variables of sort id, self is a special constant used to denote
the current agent, e is the special id (constant) of the concrete environment, v are template
variables (for any template). These follow the grammar:
ψ
.
= (v [j] = k) | R(v [j1]1 , · · · , v [jm]m ) | j1 = j2 | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2
where v ∈ V , k is a constant in ∆θ for θ = type(v), R is a relation symbol in R of arity
m ≥ 1 and j, j1, . . . , jm are either the variables of sort id that appear in j or the constant self
or the id constant e for the environment. The usual logical abbreviations apply. Intuitively,
these formulas are implicitly quantified existentially over agent ids. As we will formalize next,
they allow to test (dis)equality of agent variables with respect to agent constants (ids), and
to check whether a tuple is in a relation (whose elements are agent variables). For instance,
(v [j] = k) informally means that there exists an agent id j so that v = k for the such agent.
An id grounding of a formula ψ(j, self, e, v) in g is an assignment σ which assigns each
variable j of sort id in j, and the constants self and e, to a concrete agent id in g, denoted
σ(j) and σ(self). Specifically, we impose σ(e) = e. Intuitively, for a formula to be true in g,
one needs to find a suitable σ.
Definition 3.2. Given an interpretation I0, a snapshot g satisfies a formula ψ under I0,
denoted g |=I0 ψ, iff there exists an id grounding σ of ψ in g such that g, σ |=I0 ψ, with:
• g, σ |=I0 (v [j] = k) iff val t(g.σ(j), v) = k, where v ∈ Vt; i.e. the concrete agent
〈σ(j), g.σ(j)〉t is so that v = k;
• g, σ |=I0 R(v [j1]1 , · · · , v [jm]m ) iff for ids σ(j1), . . . , σ(jm):
RI0(val t1(g.σ(j1), v1), · · · , val tm(g.σ(jm), vm))
where for each i ∈ [1,m] we have vi ∈ Vti for some template ti ∈ {1, . . . , n, e}. Namely
R holds under I0 for the values of variables v1, . . . , vm in the local state of agents with
id σ(j1), . . . , σ(jm) as specified by σ;
• g, σ |=I0 (j1 = j2) iff σ(j1) = σ(j2);
• g, σ |=I0 ¬ψ iff g, σ 6|=I0 ψ;
• g, σ |=I0 ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff g, σ |=I0 ψ1 or g, σ |=I0 ψ2.
Note that self is freely assigned to an agent id: if g satisfies a formula with self , then an
agent exists that can be taken as self . Hence we write g |=jI0 ψ, if needed, to denote that there
exists σ with σ(self) = j so that g, σ |=I0 ψ. This informally reads as ψ is true in g for agent
with id j. E.g., assuming g is s.t. v1 = 6 for agent with id 3, and v1 = 5 for agent with id 7,
then g |=3I0 (v
[self]
1 = 6) ∧ (v [j]1 = 5).
Example. (cont.d) In the running example, the program of the cannon is so that the cannon can
fire on a waypoints only if there is at least on attacker (not already destroyed) in that location.
Hence, we have Pe(blastA) = (loc[j] = A) ∧ (destroyed[j] = false) (recall that Vt ∩ Vt′ = ∅ for
t 6= t′, hence given a variable we know to which template it belongs). Moreover, only positions
that are clear of snow can be accessed: Patt(gotoA) = (pulse-loc[e] 6= A)∧¬Snow(init, A), which
imposes that the there is no pulse on the target location and the path to A is clear of snow.
Similarly we model blastB. Note that we are assuming that the interpretation I0 is fixed, hence
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the snow condition (the relation Snow) is fixed and is not affected by the execution. As we
are going to show in Section 3.2.3, however, we define our safety check so as to check that a
condition cannot be reached by quantifying universally over all possible initial interpretations,
so as to consider any possible snow condition. Conversely, we can check that a given condition
can in fact be reached for when assuming at least one possible initial interpretation I0.
3.2 Concurrent and interleaved PMASs
In this section we introduce the two main execution semantics, hence defining two distinct
types of PMASs, called concurrent and interleaved. These are distinguished by how the (single-
step) transitions of the system are defined, which has to do with the types of interactions that
are allowed between the agents and the environment.
A (global) transition of a PMAS describes the evolution of the PMAS when a vector
of actions ~α (one for each concrete agent in g and one for the environment) are executed
from a snapshot g = 〈{〈~I1, ~L1〉1, . . . , 〈~In, ~Ln〉n}, 〈e, le〉〉, so that a new snapshot of the form
g′ = 〈{〈~I1, ~L′1〉1, . . . , 〈~In, ~L′n〉n}, 〈e, l′e〉〉 is reached. This is denoted by simply writing g ~α−→ g′.
Since each concrete agent and the environment may perform an action (in Aloct ∪Asyn) or
remain idle, multiple executions semantics can be defined, depending on the constraints we
wish to impose on the vector ~α. Let us then describe more in detail the sets Aloct and Asyn
introduced in Definition 3.1.
Symbols in Aloct , for each t, are called local actions, and those in Asyn synchronisation
actions. Actions in Aloct can only affect the local state of the concrete agent which executes
them, whereas actions in Asyn represent the synchronisation between one or more agents and
the environment and thus can affect the local state of each agent involved. Intuitively, the
synchronization actions are used to model explicit communication actions or any action with
effects that are not private to the single agent or to the environment.
As a consequence, not every vector ~α is meaningful: synchronization actions in Asyn
are shared across all templates and are used to model global events that are (potentially)
observable by any agent, whereas local actions in Aloc are private and can be freely executed.
Typically, one wants to constrain the possible evolutions so that synchronization actions and
local actions do not happen at the same time, so that we can distinguish those steps in which
the PMAS evolves in response to public actions, events or messages from those steps in which
agents update their local state in isolation.
3.2.1 Concurrent PMASs
First, we focus on those PMASs in which whenever a synchronization action is executed then
all agents and the environment are forced to synchronize, as formalized below. Intuitively,
synchronisation actions are seen as public events, affecting the local state of each concrete
agent. We call the resulting class of systems concurrent PMAS. For capturing this execution
semantics, we adopt the following definition to characterise the global transitions that are said
to be legal.
Definition 3.3. Given I0, g ~α−→ g′ is legal iff:
• g′.j = δt(g.j, ~α.j) for every 〈j, g.j〉t, t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e}, i.e., agents and environment evolve
as per their template;
• g |=jI0 Pt(~α.j) for every 〈j, g.j〉t, i.e., each action is executable and self is substituted by
j when evaluating the protocol;
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• either only local actions are executed (by agents and environment), or the environment
and at least one agent synchronize with action α ∈ Asyn . In the former case, agents
remain idle iff there is no local executable action, and in the latter iff they cannot execute
α. Formally, either:
– no j exists so that ~α.j ∈ Asyn , and for every 〈j, g.j〉t if ~α.j = nop then no α ∈ Aloct
exists with g |=jI0 Pt(α);
– ~α.e = α ∈ Asyn and at least one j 6= e exists so that ~α.j = α. Moreover, for
every agent 〈j, g.j〉t either (i) g |=jI0 Pt(α) and ~α.j = α or (ii) g 6|=
j
I0 Pt(α) and
~α.j = nop.
Note that local and synchronisation actions cannot be mixed.
3.2.2 Interleaved PMASs
Next, we formalize interleaved PMASs. In these systems, at each step either (i) a subset of
concrete agents (and the environment) perform a (non nop) action in Aloct on their local state
or (ii) the environment and a subset of the agents synchronize by executing the same action in
Asyn . nop is a special no-op action: δt(l, nop) = l for all t, l. Local and synchronization actions
cannot be mixed. We denote by ~α.j the action of the agent with id j, or of the environment
if j = e.
Definition 3.4. Given an interpretation I0, g ~α−→ g′ is legal iff:
• g′.j = δt(g.j, ~α.j) for every 〈j, g.j〉t, t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e}, i.e., agents and environment evolve
as per their template;
• g |=jI0 Pt(~α.j) for every 〈j, g.j〉t, i.e., each action is executable and self is replaced by j
for evaluating protocols;
• either only local actions are executed (by some agents and environment), or the environ-
ment and at least one agent synchronize with action α ∈ Asyn . All other agents perform
nop. Formally, either:
− no j exists so that ~α.j ∈ Asyn , that is, no synchronization action is executed; or
− the environment and at least one agent synchronize, while other agents can either
synchronize as well or freely decide to remain idle. Formally, ~α.e = α ∈ Asyn and
exists j 6= e with ~α.j = α, and ~α.j ∈ {α, nop} and g |=jI0 Pt(~α.j) for every 〈j, g.j〉t.
Example. In previous examples we did not comment on an important point: the actions
blastA/B are synchronization actions (modeling the firing action and the ‘being hit’ action of
robots). According to the definition above, when the example is modelled as an interleaved
PMAS, then a blasts is not guaranteed to destroy all targets because not all agents in location
A are forced to synchronize with such action. In fact, the two cases in which a blast destroys all
agents in the location, or just a subset, are elegantly captured by simply assuming a concurrent
or interleaved semantics. In the former, a global transition including blastA (by e) is legal iff
all agents execute blastA as well (recall that this encodes the “being hit” effects for those agents
in location A, and no-effects for others).
3.2.3 Runs of PMASs and the Reachability Task
Based on the one-step definition of (legal) global transition, we now define the notion of runs
for concurrent and interleaved PMASs. Given a PMASM = 〈{T1, . . . , Tn}, Te,R〉, a (global)
run is a pair 〈ρ, I0〉 where ρ is a sequence ρ = g0 ~α1−→ g1 ~α2−→ · · · and I0 is an interpretation
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for relation symbols as before. We restrict to runs that (i) are legal and (ii) start from an
initial snapshot, i.e., with all concrete agents in their initial local state. A global transition
as above specifies how each concrete agent g.j evolves depending on the nature of the action
~α.j. As stated before, once fixed at the start of ρ, I0 does not change and is used at each step
for evaluating formulae.
Definition 3.5. An agent formula ψgoal is reachable inM iff there exists an initial snapshot
g0 ofM s.t. a snapshot g with g |=I0 ψgoal is reachable through a run 〈ρ, I0〉 from g0.
The verification task at hand is to assess whether ψgoal is reachable, i.e. M is unsafe
w.r.t. ψgoal . If a formula is unreachable then it is so for any number of agents and all possible
interpretations. In such a cases,M is said to be safe w.r.t. ψgoal .
4 PMAS as Array-based Systems
“Array-based Systems” (ABS) [27] is a generic term used to refer to infinite state transition
systems implicitly specified using a declarative, logic-based formalism in which arrays are
manipulated via logical formulae. Intuitively, they describe a system that, starting from
an initial configuration (specified by an initial formula), is progressed through transitions
(specified by transition formulae). The precise definition depends on the specific application.
They are described using a multi-sorted theory with one kind of sorts for the indexes of
arrays and another for the elements stored therein. The content of an array is unbounded and
updated during the evolution. Since the content of an array changes over time, it is referred to
by a second-order function variable, whose interpretation in a state is that of a total function
mapping indexes to elements (so that applying the function to an index denotes the classical
read array operation). We adopt the usual FO syntactic notions of signature, term, atom,
(ground) formula, etc.
The definition, for each array variable a, requires a formula ι(a) describing its initial
configuration, and a formula τ(a, a′) describing a transition that transforms the content of
the array from a to a′. Verifying whether the system can reach configurations described by
a formula Z(a) amounts to checking whether ι(a0) ∧ τ(a0, a1) ∧ · · · ∧ τ(am−1, am) ∧ Z(am) is
satisfiable for some m. In the literature, states described by Z(a) are called unsafe (typically
capturing an unwanted condition), so we preserve this terminology.
In order to introduce verification problems in the symbolic setting of ABS, one first has
to specify the FO theories TInd and T (equipped with FO signatures ΣInd and Σ, resp.) for
array indexes and for the array elements. In this paper, TInd will be the empty theory where
ΣInd only contains equality, and T will be EUF (the theory of uninterpreted symbols), i.e., the
empty theory with signature Σ containing constants and relation symbols. This is a standard,
common setting in the ABS literature and in the SMT community.
Secondly, we have to describe the formulae used to represent three main components:
(i) the sets of states of the system; (ii) its initialization, describing (the set of) initial states;
(iii) the system evolution, capturing state transformations.
We denote by z a tuple 〈z1, . . . , zm〉 and by φ(x, a) the formula with x as free individual
variables and a as free array variables. Let Σ := 〈S, Rel, C〉 be a multi-sorted FO signature
with sorts S, relation symbols Rel and constants C, and let X be a set of variables. In
the following we use the notation F (x) := case of {κ1(x) : t1; · · ·κn(x) : tn} (where
κi(x) are quantifier-free Σ-formulae and ti are generic terms), or, equivalently, nested if-then-
else expressions: we call one such F case-defined function. We also use λ-abstractions like
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b = λj.F (j, z) in place of ∀j. b(j) = F (j, z), where typically F is a case-defined function or a
constant assignment. Intuitively, this allows to specify assignments via case-defined functions
(if-then-else) or "bulk" assignments of all cells of an array. Hence, we consider three types of
formulae:
• An initial formula ι(x, a) initialises individual and array variables via assignments and λ-
abstractions: (
∧m
i=1 xi = ci)∧(
∧k
i=1 ai = λj.di), with ci,di constants from C in Σ; for simplicity
we assume an undef constant by which we can make the initial state fully specified (as for a
PMAS), but this can be relaxed;
• A state formula of the form ∃j φ(j, x, a) specifies conditions on variables, where φ is a
quantifier-free Σ-formula and j are individual variables of the index sort;
• A transition formula τˆ relates current and new (primed) values of individual and array
variables:
∃e (γ(e, x, a) ∧ (∧mi=1 x′i := c) ∧ (∧ki=1 a′i = λj.Fi(j, e, x, a)))
where e are individual variables (of both element and index sorts); γ (the ‘guard’) is a
quantifier-free Σ-formula (or a formula quantifying universally over indexes); x′ and a′ are
renamed copies of x and a; c is a constant from C in Σ and Fj (the “conditional update”) is a
case-defined function.
We now give a general definition of array-based systems, one that helps us narrow the scope
and consider the kind that is suitable for our purposes (e.g. having the notion of action), in
place of a generic notion of array-based system, that is extremely general. Then we show how
a PMAS can be encoded as a special case of such definition (in Def. 4.2). Known results on
array-based systems (see, e.g., [27, 15]) can suitably be adapted to this variant.
Definition 4.1. An abstract AB-PMAS is a tuple:
〈Σ,Sind, x, arrX, act, ιa, τa〉
(i) Σ := 〈S, Rel, C〉 is a multi-sorted FO signature as above, such that there exists a specific
sort Aa ∈ S called ‘actions sort’ ; (ii) Sind is a set of sorts of index type; (iii) x is a set of
individual variables (containing the global variables encoding the states of the environment);
(iv) arrX is a set of arrays, one for each variable x ∈ X; (v) act is a set of arrays, with
codomain of type Aa; (vi) ιa is an initial formula, whose individual variables are x and whose
array variables are arrX and act; (vii) τa is a disjunction of transition formulae, with individual
and array variables x, x′ and arrX, act, arr′X, act
′, resp.
Formally, a FO interpretation of Σ can be thought as an instance of the ‘elements’ domain
of an abstract AB-PMAS, the individual variables are assigned to values taken from this
interpretation, Aa is interpreted over a finite set of elements called ‘actions’ and the sorts
Sind are interpreted over disjoint sets of concrete indexes. The array variables are assigned to
functions from these sets of indexes to the instance of the elements domain.
In what follows, we show how a specific abstract AB-PMAS (simply called AB-PMAS)
can be used to model a PMAS as in Section 3. To this end, we consider the different sorts
and relations as in that section, and we encode the set of agent and environment templates.
Instead of the abstract set arrX of arrays, for each template Tt with t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e} we
consider a set arrVt of arrays, one for each variable in Vt, that is used to store the current
value of that variable for each concrete agent of type t. Intuitively, the ‘cell’ for index j
in the array for variable v ∈ Vt of template Tt holds the value of v for the concrete agent
with id (in correspondence to) j in the current global state (see Fig. 2). Since only one
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T1
arrv11
· · ·
· · ·
arrv1k1
· · ·
arrA1
· · ·index j →
· · ·
· · ·
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arrv21
· · ·
· · ·
arrv2k2
· · ·
arrA2
· · ·
Te
envv1
· · ·
envvke envact
Figure 2: A depiction of the encoding of agent templates.
concrete environment exists, instead of arrays arrVe we use individual global variables envVe .
Accordingly, the set Aa of generic actions is now ∪tAloct ∪ Asyn .
Additional global variables x, which we now denote by glob for readability, are needed for
book-keeping (that is, to model any required low-level detail in the PMAS that are needed to
encode its execution, such as flags, counters, turn indicators, etc). The global variable Phase,
discussed in the next section, is an example of such variables.
Definition 4.2. Given a PMAS M := 〈{T1, . . . , Tn}, Te,R〉 and a set of initial states, an
AB-PMAS is a tuple:
〈Σ, {SIDt}t∈[1,n], glob, {arrVt}t∈[1,n], {arrAt}t∈[1,n], ι, τ〉
(i) Σ := 〈S,R, C〉, where S are sorts (including the ‘actions’ sorts SAloct for every t and SAsyn ),R are the relation symbols of M and C a set of constants (C includes a constant for each
value val t(l, v) for every t, l and v); (ii) {SIDt}t∈[1,n] is a set of sorts of indexes type, one in
correspondence of each IDt. (iii) glob is a set of individual variables used to encode the local
state of the concrete environment plus any book-keeping info (see later); (iv) {arrVt}t∈[1,n]
is a set of sets of arrays, one array for each variable v ∈ Vt of each agent template Tt,
whose elements range over ∆θ for θ = type(v); (v) {arrAt}t∈[1,n] is a set of arrays, one for
agent template Tt, whose codomain has type SAloct or SAsyn ; (vi) ι is an initial formula, whose
individual variables are glob and whose array variables are arrVt , arrAt ; (vii) τ is a disjunction
of transition formulae, with individual variables glob, glob′, and whose array variables are
arrVt , arrAt , arr
′
Vt
, arr′At .
Analogously to what done for abstract AB-PMAS, we call a model of an AB-PMAS a
FO interpretation of Σ accounting for the ‘elements’ domain, equipped with an assignment
of the individual variables to elements of that interpretation; the action sorts SAloct and SAsyn
are resp. interpreted over the disjoint sets Aloct and Asyn ; the index sorts {SIDt}t∈[1,n] are
interpreted over the disjoint sets of concrete agents ids IDt, for every t ∈ [1, n]. The array
variables are assigned to functions from these sets of ids to the elements domain of the model.
In a model of an AB-PMAS the standard notion of validity of formulae (like ι or τ) is defined.
We now turn to show in details the encoding of a PMAS into an AB-PMAS as just defined.
Given the above, the initial formula is trivial to write (it has the very same shape given before).
For transition formulae, the encoding differs (slightly) depending on the execution semantics
assumed (see Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2). Hence we talk about concurrent and interleaved
AB-PMAS.
The way in which the templates themselves are encoded is similar for both cases: as shown
in Figure 2, for each t ∈ [1, n] there are kt arrays for local variables {v t1, · · · , v tkt} = Vt plus one
array storing the current chosen action (in Asyn ∪Aloct ) or nop as default value. The concrete
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Figure 3: Intuitive progression of an interleaved AB-PMAS.
environment is instead modelled with (a subset of the) global variables: there is one global
variable for each template variable and one action variable storing the current synchronisation
action in Asyn (or nop as default value) The transition formula τ in Def. 4.2 is obtained as
the disjunction of simpler transition formulae τˆ . We start with the interleaved case.
4.1 Encoding interleaved PMAS
Each global transition of the PMAS is encoded as a sequence of ‘steps’ of the AB-PMAS, each
specified by a disjunction of transition formulae, ordered by means of an additional global
variable Phase used to guide the progression. This is intuitively shown in Figure 3, where
nodes correspond to phases and edges to (disjunctions of) transition formulae. There are
two kinds of progressions, corresponding to the two semantics in Def. 3.4: either some non-
empty subset of concrete agents execute local actions on their local state (upper branch) or a
synchronization action is performed by the environment and at least one concrete agent (lower
branch). The former case is realised by a non-empty sequence of steps following formula (1),
in which local actions are written (‘declared’) in the appropriate position j of array arrAt for
some t, followed by a single step in which the local state of all concrete agents that declared
an action is updated in bulk (by applying the function in the λ-abstraction) as in (2). As
transitions (τˆ formulae) are taken nondeterministically, this will capture all possible sequences
of (1)-steps followed by a (2)-step. The latter case is analogous: the formula in (3) makes
sure that the environment and at least one concrete agent with id j and type t can execute a
synchronization action, which is then written in a global variable envact as well as in the array
position arrAt [j]. Then, a number of concrete agents can declare the same action, updating
their action array as specified by (4). Nondeterministically, a bulk update is performed as
in formula (5), which also updates the environment. In both cases, when the initial phase is
reached again, the action arrays arrAt of each template Tt are reset to contain nop values. As
a result a possible evolution of an AB-PMAS template corresponds to a possible path in this
intuitive diagram.
We now list the transition formulae, numbered as in Figure 3. For encoding the first
step of the upper branch we use a disjunction of transition formulae as (1) below, for each
t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e} and local action α ∈ Aloct(
Phase = 0 ∨
Phase = L
)
∧ ∃jself
(
arrAt [jself] = nop ∧ Pt(α) ∧
Phase′ := L ∧ arr′At [jself] := α
)
(1)
where a disjunction is used for compactness: we can write this as two distinct formulae.
Remark 2. Above we denoted by Pt(α) the transformation of the (quantifier-free) agent
formula Pt(α) = ψ(j, self, e, v) as in Section 3 into a corresponding (quantifier-free) formula
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φ(j, x, a) for AB-PMASs, with the same syntactic shape used in state-formulas. This is for-
mally required because agent formulae, e.g., make use of local template variables, whereas
array-based formulas make use of individual and array variables. Such transformation is triv-
ial and it is not formalized further: it simply amounts to replace the variables of sort id in
ϕ with elements of the sort of index types (essentially, to replace the index variables in the
formula with index values from the sort used for agents in the AB-PMAS formalization). As
a special case, we impose that self is always replaced with a special index jself, which is exis-
tentially quantified in the transition formula above: there must exist an agent with index jself
and type t that we can take as self to evaluate Pt(α). If other index variables j are present,
these are existentially quantified as well.
The step above (see the loop on state L in Fig. 3) is repeated an unbounded number of
times, as long as a new index jself exists. Then, nondeterministically, a further step can be
executed, characterised by the transition formula below. Here, as in the remainder of the
section, we write arrVt [j] = l as a shorthand to denote that, for each variable v ∈ Vt for
some t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e}, arrv [j] = val(l, v), namely the set of arrays arrVt [j] for the concrete
agent with id j of type t encode the local state l ∈ Lt (see Fig. 2, in red). The same for
arr′Vt := λj. case of {. . . , κi : val(l, v), . . . }. The transition formula performs a bulk update
of all instances (indexes j) by applying the transition function of each Tt (below, one case is
listed for each couple of local state-action):
Phase = L ∧ Phase′ := 0 ∧ ∧
t∈{1,...,n,e}
arr′At := λj. nop ∧
∧
t∈{1,...,n,e}
arr′Vt := λj.

case of arrVt [j] = l1 ∧ arrAt [j] = α1 : δt(l1, α1)· · ·arrVt [j] = lm ∧ arrAt [j] = αk : δt(lm, αk)

 (2)
Above, for each j one possible case applies. For instance, if α1 was declared and the state is
l1, then arrVt [j] = δt(l1, α1).
For synchronization actions, for each action α ∈ Asyn and template Tt we have the following
formula, making sure that at least one concrete agent and the environment can perform the
same action, then written in the global variable envact :
Phase = 0 ∧ ∃jself
 arrAt [jself] = nop ∧ envact = nop ∧Pt(α) ∧ Pe(α) ∧
arr′At [jself] := α ∧ env′act := α ∧ Phase′ := S
 (3)
Then two possibilities exist: either other concrete agents participate in the synchronization
an unbounded number of times (via (4)), or the bulk progression is performed by applying
the formula (5) further below. Again, this is encoded as a disjunction of formulae. For each
t ∈ [1, n] and α ∈ Asyn :
Phase = S ∧ ∃jself
(
envact = α ∧ Pt(α) ∧ arrAt [jself] = nop
∧ Phase′ := S ∧ arr′At [jself] := α
)
(4)
Phase = S ∧ envact = α ∧ envVe = le ∧ env′Ve := δe(le, α)∧ env′act := nop ∧ arr′At := λj. nop ∧ Phase′ := 0 ∧
∧
t∈[1,n]
arr′Vt := λj.

case of arrVt [j] = l1 ∧ arrAt [j] = α : δt(l1, α)· · ·arrVt [j] = lm ∧ arrAt [j] = α : δt(lm, α)}

 (5)
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Example. (cont.d) The running scenario can be easily encoded, assuming a concurrent se-
mantics, through the transition formulae above (see Section 6 for the actual encoding for the
model checker). The only detail we did not discuss so far, which is needed for the scenario, is
the rule that imposes that the cannon and the attacking robots alternate their moves. This is
trivially encoded by means of an additional “book-keeping", boolean, global variable turn, so
that the protocol of each action of both templates is augmented with an additional condition
that tests such variable. Then, the value of the variable is toggled in the bulk update, i.e., in
the transitions conforming to equation (5).
4.2 Encoding concurrent PMAS
As done for the interleaved case, each global transition of the PMAS is encoded as a sequence
of ‘steps’ of the AB-PMAS, each specified by a disjunction of transition formulae, ordered by
means of an additional global variable Phase used to guide the progression. This is intuitively
shown in Figure 4, where nodes correspond to phases and edges to (disjunctions of) transition
formulae.
As shown, there are again two kinds of progressions, corresponding to the two cases in
Def. 3.3. The upper cycle represent the execution of some local action (by all agents and
environment that are able to do so), while all others execute nop. The lower cycle encodes the
case in which a synchronisation action is performed by the environment and all the concrete
agents that can execute that action (but at least one), while all others execute nop.
As depicted, the former case is realised by a sequence of steps:
• when the current phase is 0, a sequence of steps is applied. Each of these is encoded by
formula (6), in which a local action is written in the appropriate position j of array arrAt
for some t. This encodes the fact that the concrete agent of type t and id j selected one
action to execute. This step can be executed an arbitrary number of times, but only
once for each concrete agent and for the environment;
• when the current phase is L and for every concrete agent and the environment it is true
that either the one local action was selected or that all local actions are not executable,
then one further step is enabled and the overall process reaches phase L2. This is
captured by formula (7);
• when the current phase is L2, only one possible step can be taken: all concrete agents
that selected an action are updated in bulk and the local action each of them selected
is executed (by applying the function in the λ-abstraction) as in (8).
Note that transitions (τ formulae) are taken nondeterministically, hence this will capture
all possible sequences of (6)-steps until the guard of (7) is satisfied, followed by a (7)-step and
a (8)-step. The latter case (bottom cycle) is analogous:
• the formula in (9) makes sure that the environment and at least one concrete agent with
id j and type t can execute a synchronisation action, which is then written in a global
variable envact as well as in the array position arrAt [j];
• then, concrete agents can select the same action, updating their action array as specified
by (10);
• in a further step, that is only enabled when for every concrete agents it is true that
either envact is not executable or was indeed selected, the phase is progressed to S2.
This is captured by formula (11);
• when the current phase is S2, a bulk update is finally performed as in formula (12),
which also updates the environment.
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Figure 4: Intuitive progression of a concurrent AB-PMAS.
In both cycles above, when the initial phase 0 is reached again, the action arrays arrAt
of each template Tt are reset to contain nop values. As a result a possible evolution of an
AB-PMAS template corresponds to a possible path in this intuitive diagram, chosen nonde-
terministically.
We now list the transition formulae. For encoding the first step of the upper branch we
use a disjunction of transition formulae as (6) below, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e} and local action
α ∈ Aloct (a disjunction is also used in (6) for compactness: we can write this as two distinct
formulae). By these formulae a concrete agent declares action α (recall that primed variables
denote updates): (
Phase = 0 ∨
Phase = L
)
∧ ∃jself
(
arrAt [jself] = nop ∧ Pt(α) ∧
Phase′ := L ∧ arr′At [jself] := α
)
(6)
The same remark for the interleaved case applies.
The step above (see the loop on state L in Figure 3) can be repeated an unbounded number
of times, as long as a new index jself exists. The guard of the following formula requires that
for every j either the selected action is not equal to nop, i.e. no action was selected, or that
no local action is executable:
Phase = L ∧ ∀j

∧
t∈{1,...,n,e}
arrAt [j] 6= nop ∨∧
α∈Aloct
¬Pt(α) ∧ Phase′ := L2
 (7)
Then a further step becomes enabled, characterised by the transition formula below. Here,
as in the remainder of the section, we write arrVt [j] = l as a shorthand to denote that, for
each variable v ∈ Vt for some t ∈ {1, . . . , n, e}, arrv [j] = val(l, v), namely the set of arrays
arrVt [j] for the concrete agent with id j of type t encode the local state l ∈ Lt (see Figure 2,
in red). The same for arr′Vt := λj. case of {. . . , κi : val(l, v), . . . }. The transition formula
performs a bulk update of all concrete agents (indexes j) that already declared an action (or
have nop in their cell), depending of the type t (below, one case is listed for each couple of
local state and action, for each template Tt):
Phase = L2 ∧ Phase′ := 0 ∧
∧
t∈{1,...,n,e}
arr′At := λj. nop ∧
∧
t∈{1,...,n,e}
arr′Vt := λj.

case of arrVt [j] = l1 ∧ arrAt [j] = α1 : δt(l1, α1)· · ·arrVt [j] = lm ∧ arrAt [j] = αk : δt(lm, αk)

 (8)
Above, for each j one possible case applies. E.g., if α1 was declared and the state is l1, then
arrVt [j] = δt(l1, α1).
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For synchronization actions, for each action α ∈ Asyn and template Tt we have the following
formula, which makes sure that at least one concrete agent and the environment can perform
the same action, which is then written in the global variable envact :
Phase = 0 ∧ ∃jself
arrAt [jself] = nop ∧ envact = nop ∧Pt(α) ∧ Pe(α) ∧ arr′At [jself] := α ∧
env′act := α ∧ Phase′ := S
 (9)
After the phase is updated to S, either other concrete agents participate in the synchronisation
(transition formula (10)) or, if no more agent can select action α, the phase is first progressed
to S2 (formula (11)) and then a bulk update of local states is performed by applying the
formula (12) further below. For each t ∈ [1, n] and α ∈ Asyn :
Phase = S ∧ ∃jself
(
envact = α ∧ Pt(α) ∧ arrAt [jself] = nop
∧ Phase′ := S ∧ arr′At [jself] := α
)
(10)
Then:
Phase = S ∧ ∀j
( ∧
t∈{1,...,n,e}
arrAt [j] 6= nop ∨
¬Pt(α) ∧ Phase′ := S2
)
(11)
Finally, a bulk update is executed, which resets the phase and applies the effect of α for each
agent (that declared such action instead of nop) and for the environment:
Phase = S2 ∧ envact = α ∧ envVe = le ∧ env′Ve := δe(le, α)∧ env′act := nop ∧ arr′At := λj. nop ∧ Phase′ := 0 ∧
∧
t∈[1,n]
arr′Vt := λj.

case of arrVt [j] = l1 ∧ arrAt [j] = α : δt(l1, α)· · ·arrVt [j] = lm ∧ arrAt [j] = α : δt(lm, α)}

 (12)
5 Verification
We denote by ab(M) the AB-PMAS obtained by encoding a PMAS M as in the previous
section (so we will refer to concurrent and interleaved AB-PMAS). A safety formula for
ab(M) is a state formula φ, as defined in Section 4, of the form ∃j.φ(j, x, a). These formulae
are used to characterise undesired states of ab(M).
By adopting a customary terminology for array-based systems, we say that ab(M) is safe
with respect to φ if intuitively the system has no finite run leading from ι to φ. Formally,
this means that there is no interpretation I0 of relations and no possible assignment to the
individual and array variables x0, a0, . . . , xk, ak such that the formula
ι(x0, a0) ∧ τ(x0, a0, x1, a1) ∧ · · · ∧ τ(xk−1, ak−1, xk, ak) ∧ φ(, xk, ak)
is valid in any model of ab(M). The safety problem for ab(M) is the following: Given a
safety formula φ as before, decide whether ab(M) is safe with respect to φ. It is immediate
to see that this matches Def. 3.5: the AB-PMAS cannot be safe w.r.t φ if there exists an
initial interpretation I0 so that a global state g with g |=I0 ψ, where ψ is an agent formula
with ψ = φ, is reachable through a run 〈ρ, I0〉, and vice-versa (recall the description of ·¯ in
Remark 2).
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Theorem 5.1. An agent formula ψgoal is reachable in a PMAS M iff the corresponding
AB-PMAS ab(M) is unsafe w.r.t ψgoal .
Example. (cont.d) Let ψgoal = ∃j.(loc[j] = target): at least one agent can reach the target
location. In both concurrent and interleaved cases, the PMAS is unsafe if the protocol of the
cannon is arbitrary, as it may adopt a naive behavior and not defend the target location.
Even if we assume that the cannon behaves according to the plan we described when
introducing the running scenario (see Sec. 1), then a concurrent PMAS is safe. As anticipated,
however, an interleaved PMAS is unsafe because it is enough for two robots (or more) to move
to a waypoint, then to the target, for winning the scenario. Indeed, when two or more robots
reach a waypoint and the cannon fires at them, there are no guarantees that all these robots
will be destroyed. For this reason, the same conclusion applies for further goal formulae such
as ψgoal = ∃j1, j2.(loc[j1] = target ∧ loc[j2] = target ∧ j1 6= j2): a run with three robots exists.
5.1 Soundness, Completeness, Decidability
The algorithm described in Figure 1 shows the SMT-based backward reachability procedure (or,
backward search) for handling the safety problem for an AB-PMAS ab(M). An integral part
of the algorithm is to compute symbolic preimages. For that purpose, for any τ(z, z′) and φ(z)
(where z′ are renamed copies of z), we define Pre(τ, φ) as the formula ∃z′(τ(z, z′)∧φ(z′)). The
preimage of the set of states described by a state formula φ(x) is the set of states described
by Pre(τ, φ) (notice that, when τ =
∨
τˆ , then Pre(τ, φ) =
∨
Pre(τˆ , φ)). Backward search
computes iterated preimages of a safety formula φ, until a fixpoint is reached (in that case,
ab(M) is safe w.r.t. φ) or until a set intersecting the initial states (i.e., satisfying ι) is found
(in that case, ab(M) is unsafe w.r.t. φ) . Inclusion (Line 2) and disjointness (Line 3) tests
can be discharged via proof obligations to be handled by SMT solvers. The fixpoint is reached
when the test in Line 2 returns unsat : the preimage of the set of the current states is included
in the set of states reached by the backward search so far. The test at Line 3 is true when
the states visited so far by the backward search (represented as the iterated application of
preimages to the safety formula φ) includes a possible initial state (i.e., a state satisfying ι).
If this is the case, then ab(M) is unsafe w.r.t. φ.
The procedure either does not terminate or returns a SAFE/UNSAFE result. Given a PMAS
M and a safety formula ψgoal , a SAFE (resp. UNSAFE) result is correct iff ab(M) is safe (resp.
unsafe) w.r.t. ψgoal .
Definition 5.2. Given a AB-PMAS ab(M) and a safety formula ψgoal , a verification proce-
dure for checking (un)safety is: (i) sound if, when it terminates, it returns a correct result;
(ii) partially sound if a SAFE result is always correct; (iii) complete if, whenever UNSAFE is
the correct result, then UNSAFE is indeed returned.
The same definition can be given for PMASs.
If partially sound, an UNSAFE result may be not correct due to “spurious” traces. Also, as
the preimage computation can diverge on a safe system, there is no guarantee of termination.
However, since AB-PMAS are a special case of the abstract AB-PMAS (Def. 4.1), we can
adapt known results on array-based systems (see [27, 15]).
Theorem 5.3. Backward search for the safety problem is partially sound and complete for
concurrent AB-PMAS.
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Algorithm 1: backward search BReach(ab(M), φ)
1 B ←− ⊥;
2 while φ ∧ ¬B is satisfiable do
3 if (ι ∧ φ is satisfiable) then return UNSAFE;
4 B ←− φ ∨B;
5 φ←− Pre(τ, φ); // τ is as in Def. 4.2
6 return SAFE;
Theorem 5.4. Backward search for the safety problem is sound and complete for interleaved
AB-PMAS.
Proof Sketch. For soundness we need suitable decision procedures for the satisfiability tests in
Alg. 1. By taking inspiration from [27, 15], we can show that the preimage of a state formula
can be converted to a state formula and that entailment can be decided via finite instantiation
techniques. For completeness, finite unsafe traces are found after finitely many steps.
It follows that, given Theorem 5.1, (i) for concurrent PMAS we have partial soundness
due to the need of using universal quantification in transition formulae (see Sec. 4.2), and (ii)
ours is a sound and complete procedure for checking (un)safety of interleaved PMAS as only
existential quantification is needed (see Sec. 4.1). Backward search for interleaved AB-PMAS
is thus a semi-decision procedure. Universal quantification proves to be crucial, as available
results on verification of array-based systems [27, 15] cannot guarantee that in fact all indexes
are considered, leading to executions in which some indexes will be simply “disregarded” from
that point on. This induces spurious runs in the encoded PMAS, akin to a lossy system [4].
5.2 A Condition for Termination
We show under which (sufficient) condition we can guarantee termination of the backward
search, which will gives us a decision procedure for unsafety. Although technical proofs are
quite involved at the syntactic level, they can be intuitively understood as based on this locality
condition: the states “visited” by the backward search can be represented by state-formulae
which do not include direct/indirect comparisons and “joins" of distinct state variables for
different agent ids. E.g., we cannot have x[j1] = y[j2], which equates the current variable x
and y of the concrete agents with ids j1 and j2. We can however write x[j1] = c, y[j2] = c for
a constant c.
Of course, if this property is true for φ, it does not necessary hold for the formula obtained
by “regressing" φ w.r.t. some transition formula τˆ , i.e., Pre(τˆ , φ) as those in Section 4: τˆ
includes translations Pt(α) of template protocols Pt(α) for action α. Formally, we call a state
formula local if it is a disjunction of the formulae of the form:
∃j1 · · · ∃jm (Eq(j1, . . . , jm) ∧
∧m
k=1 φk(jk, x, a)) (13)
Here, Eq is a conjunction of variable (dis)equalities, φk are quantifier-free formulae, and
j1, . . . , jm are individual variables of index sort. Note how each φk in (13) can contain only
the existentially quantified index variable jk. As said before, this limitation necessarily has an
impact on transition formulae as well. We say that a transition formula τˆ is local if whenever
a formula φ is local, so is Pre(τˆ , φ).
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Theorem 5.5. BReach(ab(M), ψgoal ) always terminates if (i) the AB-PMAS is interleaved
and (ii) its transition formula τ =
∨
τˆ is a disjunction of local transition formulae and (iii)
ψgoal is local.
Proof Sketch. Although involved, the proof follows a similar argument to that of Thm. 6.2
in [15]: it can be proved that an AB-PMAS corresponds to a particular case of acyclic local
RASs, therein defined, but without “data” and extended with uninterpreted relations.
Notice that the structure of the proof of the previous theorem follows the schema of a
proof from [19], but there is a significant difference: the decidability result in [19] is based
on locality and applies to array-based systems whose FO-signatures do not have relational
symbols, whereas here our array-based systems do have free relational symbols. This difference
is reflected in the kind of FO-formulae that are involved.
The locality condition is ‘semantic’ for transition formulae and syntactic for state formulae.
However, since the updates in transition formulae in Sec. 4 are assignment to constants, if all
Pt(α) are local then τ is local.
It is immediate to verify that agent protocols and the goal formula in our running scenario
are both local, hence checking safety is decidable.
6 Implementation
In this section we illustrate and evaluate experimentally our tool illustrate our implementation
approach, called SAFE: the Swarm Safety Detector, based on the third-party model checker
MCMT [28]. We organize this section as follows: first, in Section 6.1 we describe the MCMT
model-checker and comment on the encoding of PMASs into MCMT input files. Then, in
Section 6.2, we showcase our SAFE tool for the automated encoding of PMASs into an AB-
PMAS (in the format MCMT expects) and subsequent extraction of witnesses of unsafety,
and in Section 7 we evaluate experimentally our overall approach and tool chain.
6.1 MCMT: Model Checker Modulo Theories
MCMT [28] is a declarative and deductive symbolic model checker for safety properties of
infinite state systems, based on backward reachability and fix-points computations (with calls
to an SMT solver). The input of the software is a simple, textual representation of an ABS,
including (i) the declaration of individual and array variables, (ii) the initial state formula,
(iii) the goal state formula, (iv) the list of transition formulae (i.e. either formulae (1)-(5) or
formulae (6)-(12) in Sec. 4). It is thus sufficient to write a one-to-one textual counterpart of
a given AB-PMASs as input to MCMT.
If the system is unsafe, a witness is provided, from which one can extract unsafe runs and
refine the model (see Section 6.2 on our implementation of this step). MCMT supports forms
of universal quantification needed for concurrent PMAS (see Sec. 4.2), in which case a warning
is issued, as this may generate spurious runs (see below Theorem 5.4).
6.1.1 MCMT input files for interleaved and concurrent AB-PMASs
We now exemplify the textual encoding by listing the salient portions of the input file for our
running examples. With the exception of minor syntactic details, such textual encoding is
the same for the interleaved and concurrent cases, hence in this paper we focus on the former
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case only (the difference is simply represented by which transitions formulae we must encode
to MCMT, i.e., either formulae (1)-(5) or formulae (6)-(12) in Sec. 4).
The textual encoding starts with some definitions, which intuitively define the sorts that
are used in the ABS. For the running example, these are:
:smt (define-type Action)
:smt (define-type PhaseSort)
:smt (define-type BOOLE)
:smt (define-type StringLoc)
:smt (define-type turnSort)
Intuitively, we need (distinct) sorts for actions, the phase flag used to guide the progression
(see Section 4), booleans, locations (for robot positions, blasts and the pulse) and turns (as
our example is turn-based, alternating the moves of the cannon the moves of all robots - see
the example at the end of Section 4.1).
Then, constants and relations are declared with their corresponding sort.
:smt (define Snow ::(-> StringLoc StringLoc ))
:smt (define pulseA ::Action)
:smt (define pulseB ::Action)
:smt (define gotoA ::Action)
:smt (define gotoB ::Action)
:smt (define goTargetA ::Action)
:smt (define goTargetB ::Action)
:smt (define blastA ::Action)
:smt (define blastB ::Action)
:smt (define TRUE ::BOOLE)
:smt (define FALSE ::BOOLE}
:smt (define A ::StringLoc)
:smt (define B ::StringLoc)
:smt (define init ::StringLoc)
:smt (define target ::StringLoc)
:smt (define P0 ::PhaseSort)
:smt (define PL ::PhaseSort)
:smt (define PS ::PhaseSort)
:smt (define turnTEMPS ::turnSort)
:smt (define turnREST ::turnSort)
After some further declarations needed by MCMT, local and global variables are declared.
In our encoding, consistently with the encodings illustrated in Section 4, local variables are
used for the template variables and global variables are used for both the environment variables
and additional book-keeping data.
For instance, for encoding our running example we include:
:local locATT StringLoc
:local destroyedATT BOOLE
:local actATT Action
:global pulseLoc StringLoc
:global actEnv Action
:global phase PhaseSort
The three arrays (the local variables) are used, respectively, to hold the location of robots,
their destroyed (boolean) state, the actions they currently selected for execution. The remain-
ing three (global) variables are used to hold the location towards which the pulse is currently
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directed, the action selected for execution by the environment, the phase value needed for
encoding the transitions.
Further, the initial states are represented by means of a simple formula, written as a
conjunction of conditions:
:initial
:var x
:cnj (= pulselocE NULL_StringLoc) (= actE NULL_Action) (= locATT[x] init) (= destroyedATT[x] FALSE)
(= actATT[x] NULL_Action) (= turn turnTEMPS) (= phase P0)
The conditions above require that: the EMP pulse is not directed towards any waypoint, the
environment has declared no action, all robots are in their initial state (here, x is implicitly
quantified universally), no robot is destroyed, no robot declared yet an action, the turn is of
the cannon, the phase is equal to 0. Notice that nothing is said about the Snow relation, as
we want to check that the system is safe irrespective of the snow conditions.
Further, we specify the safety formula to verify. For our example, this formula requires
that at least one robot exists (we use an index z1, implicitly quantified existentially) so that
the cell of array locATT has value equal to target, namely the robot is in the target location:
:u_cnj (= locATT[z1] target)
Transition formulae are encoded directly. For instance, the transition formula (1), for the
local action gotoB in the running scenario (in the interleaved case), is encoded in MCMT as two
formulae: one for Phase = 0 and one for Phase = L. The guard is composed of six conjuncts,
where the index variable x is used to express conditions on the same concrete agent: the first
two correspond to Phase = 0 and arrAt [jself] = nop in (1), and the rest encode the template’s
protocol function, i.e. correspond to Pt(α) in (1). Intuitively, they require that the robot is
in the initial location, is not destroyed, there is no pulse directed at the waypoint, the path
is clear of snow. The keyword :numcases specifies how many outcomes this :transition has. In
this case two: one for the index j that is taken as x (which is arbitrarily selected) and one for
the rest. This reconstruct the existential quantification ∃jself in (1). In the first case, which
is applied to the agent with index jself, the array variable actROBOTS[j] is updated to gotoB and
phase to L while the others remain unchanged (assignments are encoded by simply listing, in
the same order as variable definitions above, either a new value, thus expressing an update,
or by simply repeating the variable name if its value is not updated). In the latter case only
the phase is updated, as this case applies for all agents that are assigned an index other than
jself.
:transition
:var j
:var x
:guard
(= phase 0)
(= actATT[x] Nop_Action)
(= locATT[x] init)
(= destroyedATT[x] FALSE)
(not (= pulseLoc B))
(= Snow (start B) FALSE)
:numcases 2
:case (= x j)
:val locATT[j]
:val destroyedATT[j]
:val gotoB
:val pulseLoc
:val actEnv
:val L
:case
:val locATT[j]
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:val destroyedATT[j]
:val actATT[j]
:val pulseLoc
:val actEnv
:val L
The encoding the rest of the transitions follows the same approach, although one has to
manually write all the transitions, which is a delicate and cumbersome task, prone to error (the
running example, for the interleaved execution semantics, requires 26 transitions). Moreover,
the transition commented above correspond to the most simple transition formula in Section 4,
while other transitions require more verbose encodings in MCMT.
For instance, the transition formula (2) that represents the bulk update of the environment
together with all agents which declared a local action is encoded a set of MCMT transitions,
one for each possible local action of the environment (since disjunction is not allowed in the
syntax of MCMT, hence multiple transitions must be specified for capturing disjunctions).
In our example, the environment has two local actions, namely pulseA and pulseB, hence two
MCMT transitions must be added, each containing the required if-then-else encoding that
matches the case-defined functions of the form case of used in Section 4. We list here only
the first transition, for pulseA:
:transition
:var j
:guard
(= phase PL)
(= actE pulseA)
(= turn turnTEMPS)
:numcases 5
:case (= actATT[j] gotoA)
:val A
:val destroyedATT[j]
:val NULL_Action
:val A
:val NULL_Action
:val P0
:val turnREST
:case (= actATT[j] gotoB)
:val B
:val destroyedATT[j]
:val NULL_Action
:val A
:val NULL_Action
:val P0
:val turnREST
:case (= actATT[j] goTargetA)
:val target
:val destroyedATT[j]
:val NULL_Action
:val A
:val NULL_Action
:val P0
:val turnREST
:case (= actATT[j] goTargetB)
:val target
:val destroyedATT[j]
:val NULL_Action
:val A
:val NULL_Action
:val P0
:val turnREST
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:case
:val locATT[j]
:val destroyedATT[j]
:val NULL_Action
:val A
:val NULL_Action
:val P0
:val turnREST
The guard of this transition requires the phase to be equal to L, the action of the environ-
ment to be pulseA. We do not comment here on turns, as this is a mere detail of the example at
hand, but it is not required in general. There are 5 cases, which account for the four possible
actions that each robot might have selected, plus a catch-all case that is used if no action was
selected (namely the agent performed nop). In each of these cases, the appropriate variable
update is performed (again, the order is dictated by the order in which these variables were
defined in the file – see above).
This justifies the need of a user-oriented approach, which we comment in Section 6.2. First,
we very briefly report on how the solver is executed.
6.1.2 Executing MCMT
Once the textual encoding is done, MCMT can be simply executed via command line, speci-
fying as argument the textual file: ./mcmt file.txt. For more details and options, please refer
to the MCMT manual [1].
6.2 SAFE: the Swarm Safety Detector
In this section, we present and illustrate SAFE: the Swarm Safety Detector [2], i.e., our
own implementation of a user interface that allows to directly employ in practice the results
presented in this paper. The tool automatises the textual encoding of the PMAS as MCMT
input files, by relying on a MAS-oriented modelling framework which takes care of the textual
conversion. This allows the user to focus on modelling the PMAS, i.e., the agent templates
and the environment template, without worrying about how their constructs translate in
the encoding for the model checker. As we show in this section, the tool also allows to
convert the witnesses for unsafety that MCMT returns (when the input ABS is unsafe) back
into executions of the original PMAS. The resulting tool chain constitutes a user-friendly
and effective, implemented approach for modelling and verifying the safety of parameterized
multi-agent systems. Some preliminary experimental evaluation is performed in Section 7.
6.2.1 The SAFE modeling interface
The interface of SAFE: the Swarm Safety Detector is available at [2], and can be used to
model and encode into MCMT input files (i.e., into textual representations of array-based
systems) any PMAS as those introduced in this paper. As an example, Figure 5 shows the
running example of this paper as it appears in the SAFE GUI.
In its present version, there are a number of minor differences between SAFE and the
representations used here:
• The version of SAFE currently available, called SAFE Base, can only be used to model
interleaved PMASs. We are currently working on SAFE For All, an extension of SAFE
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Figure 5: The main part of the SAFE Base interface, showing the PMAS model for the running
example. The GUI provides intuitive buttons to either add or remove any component from
the templates, so that there is no manual coding required.
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Base which admits the kind on universal quantification needed to represent concurrent
PMASs (see the transition formulae in Section 4.2, where universal quantification is
used);
• The representation of agent and environment templates used by SAFE differs slightly
from the one used here, although it is equivalent. Indeed, Definition 3.1 defines an agent
templates as a labelled, finite-state transition system, whereas SAFE assumes a more
succinct representation, where instead of listing explicitly the local states and transitions
of the templates, we assume a STRIPS-like approach. Therefore, instead of an explicit
finite-state machine labelled by actions, actions are specified by means of pre- and post-
conditions;
• Similarly, the GUI of SAFE Base does not allow to use disjunction in action precondi-
tions. This implies that, whenever we want to model an action label a that is available
under two distinct conditions (i.e., a precondition of the form φ1 ∨ φ2, we need instead
to use a distinct copy a′ of the action and assign to these the preconditions φ1 and φ2,
respectively. Future versions of SAFE will avoid this restriction.
At the same time, SAFE Base includes some minor features that were not included in the
formal model discussed here, as these are primarily implementation details:
• Apart from local actions and synchronization actions, the tool allows a further type
of actions, called individual synchronization actions, that can only be executed by the
environment and by exactly another agent at the same time. In Section 7.2 we provide an
additional example of PMAS in which such feature is essential (note that this corresponds
to a type of action considered in [30], as discussed in Section 2.2);
• The turn-based mechanics, which allows to alternate the actions of two distinct subsets of
the templates (as in our running example), is a core-feature of the tool and can be easily
enabled or disabled without the need of manually implement the alternation logic. In
order to make this compatible with the execution semantics for synchronization actions,
SAFE Base allows an additional annotation of these actions, by which it is possible to
specify the initiator template of each synchronization action;
• The GUI allows to request additional conditions on the instances of PMAS that the
verification should consider. For instance, we can request that a certain template is not
empty (that is, that at least a concrete agent with that template exists). More of these
features are continuously being implemented in SAFE.
7 Experimental evaluation
In this section we report on preliminary, simple experiments run with MCMT on the inputs
obtained as outputs of SAFE: the Swarm Safety Detector (Base). We first consider the running
example of this paper, then introduce a further one from the literature.
7.1 Experiments on the running example
The textual encoding of the ABS corresponding to the PMAS in the running example, obtained
through SAFE Base, is solved by MCMT v.2.9 (which uses an old version of Yices - the 1.0.40-
as a background SMT solver) in 2.7 seconds on a early-2015 Macbook (2.7 GHz Dual-Core
Intel Core i5, 8 GB RAM). MCMT correctly reports that the system is unsafe.1
1This example is available at: http://safeswarms.club/page/mcmt/cannon.
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The input file, of which some parts are reported and commented in the previous section,
has 3 local variables for the robot template att, 3 global variables and 26 transitions.
MCMT gives in output the following sequence as witness of unsafety:
[t2][t17][t3_1][t15][t1][t16][t5_1][t15]
where each tn represents the execution of the n-th transition in the input file, following the
order in which they appear. SAFE provides an input dialogue in which one can paste such
witnesses, so as to retrieve the “run template" of the PMAS that corresponds to such sequences.
We say that such run is a “run template" because, unlike the definition of run of PMASs given
in Section 3.2.3, it does not list the precise number of concrete agents that performed the
action associated to that transitions. For the sequence above, the run template shown by
SAFE imposes the following sequence of actions:
pulseB, gotoA, pulseA, goTarget
in which, trivially, a number of agents reaches the target while avoiding the EMP pulse used by
the target, which in this instance does not even attempt to use the blasts to destroy robots.
In fact, transition 2 corresponds to equation (1) when α = pulseB and t = e, followed by
transition 17 which corresponds to the bulk update as in equation (2). Similarly, transition 3
corresponds to (1) when α = gotoA and t = Att, followed again by a transition conforming to
equation (2), and so on.
When a PMAS is determined to be unsafe, SAFE does not provide support for embedding
into the model the witness provided by MCMT, so it is the responsibility of the user to update
their MAS by taking insights from the witness and then check the new model again.
By increasing the number of agent templates and number of waypoints required to reach
the target on either of the two paths (i.e., by having waypoints A1, . . . , An and B1, . . . , Bn),
we can test the scalability of our approach (i.e., the use of SAFE and MCMT for checking
safety of PMASs) with respect to the length of possible runs. In these versions of the running
example, cannon blasts hit all locations on the same path simultaneously, the EMP pulse can
block all robots on the entire path at which it is directed, and the protocol of the cannon is so
that the cannon can freely fire at either path without checking that there are available robot
targets. This is achieved by adding a further path variable to robot templates.2
2These examples are available at: http://safeswarms.club/page/mcmt/exZb with Z=2..6
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1 -
1 -
26
1 -
2 -
28
1 -
3 -
32
1 -
4 -
36
1 -
5 -
40
1 -
6 -
44
3
22
49
96
176
# of agent templates - # of waypoints per path - # of transitions
se
co
nd
s
As it can be seen from the experiments, the number of transitions increase slightly, and
the execution time increases as well as the number of actions and length of the shortest unsafe
runs increases. Indeed, there is of course a direct relationship between the length of the
PMAS runs that must be checked and the depth of the state-space exploration of MCMT.
The number of variables remains instead the same (although more constants are introduced).
These findings are not surprising, because the number of possible actions combinations, for
agents and environment, remains the same at each step.
If instead we increase the number of templates, by introducing further copies of the robot
template from the original problem instance (preserving only waypoints A and B), then both the
number of transitions and variables increase substantially, leading to much longer execution
times. This was expected, as the possible combinations of actions, when considering all agent
templates, grow exponentially. We report below on the average execution times for the case
of 1, 2, 3 and 4 robot templates (in addition to the environment template).3
1 -
7 -
26
2 -
12
- 3
8
3 -
16
- 5
2
4 -
20
- 6
6
48
367
1,530
# of agent templates - # of variables - # of transitions
se
co
nd
s
To run these experiments, we disabled the default setting of MCMT which puts a bound
of 50 to the possible number of transitions.
3These examples are available at: http://safeswarms.club/page/mcmt/exZ with Z=2..4
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Interestingly, if we remove the assumption that the agents and the environment alternate
their moves (thus also removing the global variable turn that is automatically added by SAFE),
determining the unsafety of the PMAS becomes much easier.4
1 -
6 -
23
2 -
11
- 3
5
3 -
15
- 4
9
4 -
19
- 6
3
1
8
32
90
# of agent templates - # of variables - # of transitions
se
co
nd
s
Apparently, and contrary to the intuitive understanding, the verification becomes more
challenging as the PMAS becomes more specified (that is, with more detailed pre- and post-
conditions of actions, turn indicators, goal conjuncts).
This highlights the limitations of this implementation, and the use of MCMT for larger
examples, although the examples we can find in the literature are smaller than these, and
involve typically two agent templates. Nonetheless, we should keep in mind that these problem
instances are intrinsically computationally demanding, since checking the safety of a given
PMAS is exponential in the number of variables (as these determine the number of global
states) and the number of global transitions. For example, for the case of 3 agent templates,
more than 800k calls were made to the SMT solver (i.e., to Yices) and 2k symbolic nodes were
explored. For the case of 4 templates, 4M calls are made.
7.2 A further example
In this section we introduce a further example, inspired to the train-gate-controller scenario
that has been repeatedly used in the literature.
This scenarios allows us to discuss one of the features of SAFE that are not included in this
formal framework: individual synchronization actions first discussed in Section 6.2.1. These
are like regular synchronization actions, with the difference that exactly one agent synchronizes
with the environment.
Example. The PMAS is constituted by a small rail network where a (unbounded) number
of trains share one critical section, namely a tunnel passage. The tunnel is equipped with
a controller module that is responsible to regulate the access, so that at all times at most
one train is in the tunnel. For doing so, both sides of the tunnel are equipped with traffic
lights. While the status of the traffic lights can be either red or green, each train can be in
four different states: queuing for the permission to enter, in the tunnel, away from the tunnel,
forbidden to enter. Moreover, trains can be either normal trains or prioritized trains, so that
4To replicate these experiments, it is sufficient to turn off the template alternation through the GUI.
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while a prioritized train can enter the tunnel at any given time (if the tunnel is free), normal
trains can only be allowed to enter (by the controller) when there are no priority trains waiting.
To accomplish this, the traffic lights has two distinct variants of the green color: prioritized
green and normal green. Prioritized green is used by the controller to serve prioritized trains,
whereas normal green is used by the controller to serve normal trains. As a consequence,
prioritized trains can be forbidden to enter only if away from the tunnel (by changing the
color of the light to normal green).
The scenario can be encoded as a PMAS composed of an agent template representing
prioritized trains, an agent template representing normal trains, and an environment template
representing the controller. A prioritized train is initially in state Waiting, the controller is
initially in state PGreen, and a normal train is initially in state Forbidden. Therefore prioritised
trains are initially waiting to enter the tunnel, normal trains are initially locked from entering
the tunnel, and the controller initially serves only prioritized trains. The actions p_enter
and p_exit are individual synchronization actions modelling (exactly one of the) prioritized
trains entering and exiting the tunnel. Similarly, the actions n_enter and n_exit are individual
synchronization actions enabling the normal trains to enter and exit the tunnel. The action
allow_n is a synchronous action representing the action of the controller to allow normal train
(switch to normal green), and similarly allow_p. These need to be synchronization actions
(rather than local actions of the environment) since their execution must be visible to the
trains as well, which also change their internal local state. Finally, the actions n_approach and
p_approach are local actions that trains execute for approaching the tunnel and hence wait for
their green light.
The safety checking task is to verify that it is not possible for two trains (of any type) to
be in the tunnel at the same time, and it is easy to verify, given the description above, that
the system is in fact safe. Indeed, the street light guarantees (via individual synchronization
actions) that only one train enters the tunnel; moreover, the color is set again to green (either
normal or priority) only when a train exits the tunnel.
As expected, MCMT reports that the PMAS encoding this scenario is safe. The verification
takes 6.7 seconds on the same setup as in the previous experiments.5
As before, we attempt to stress the use of MCMT for the verification of this scenario by
adding further copies of agent templates (in this case, normal trains), to make the number of
variables and global transitions grow. Note that the safety formula grows (in length) as the
number of templates grows as we want to forbid any combination of trains in the tunnel. The
execution of MCMT for 4 normal train templates (with 11 variables and 58 transitions) reports
an average execution time of 58 seconds. To encode the case of 6 normal train templates, the
formula would need 27 disjuncts. Due to the current limitation of MCMT, a bound of 9 exists,
so we cannot increase further the number of templates.
As a final note, observe that a concurrent PMAS allows us to specify, by design, that no
train can enter the tunnel if there exists another train currently there (or, alternatively, that
the action of turning the street light to color green cannot be executed). Indeed, universal
quantification allows us to write, as action preconditions, that all trains are not in the tun-
nel. This enhanced input formalism should allow a more natural modelling of examples. To
implement this in practice in SAFE, however, we need the upcoming version SAFE For All.
5This example is available at: http://safeswarms.club/page/mcmt/train.
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Figure 6: The main part of the SAFE Base interface, showing the PMAS model for the trains
example.
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8 Conclusions and Future Work
We devised a novel technique for checking safety of PMASs. The advantages are various,
as summarised in Sec.2. This opens up towards richer parameterised and data-aware MAS
settings to be tackled in a novel, solid, vast and extensively studied range of formal techniques
which were so far not directly available to the AI verification community. In future work, we
will enrich this (i) beyond interleaved PMASs, (ii) with full-fledged, relational, read/write
databases, (iii) also add cardinality constraints and (iv) experimentally evaluate and compare
MCMT as a model checker for this problem. The possibility of continuing along so different
extensions within the same framework is a direct consequence of this work, which establishes a
formal connection between parameterised verification in MAS and the long-standing tradition
of SMT-based model checking for array-based systems.
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A Appendix
In this Appendix we provide the full proofs of the theorems from Section 5.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5.4.
In this section we provide a proof of Theorem 5.4. The proof is quite involved and follows the
structure, even if with several modifications, of an analogous theorem for Relational Artifact
Systems (RASs [19]).
We observe that transition formulae introduced in Section 4 do not go beyond first-order
logic. We clarify this point now, before going into formal proofs.
First of all, to obtain a more compact representation, we made use there of definable
extensions as a means for introducing so-called case-defined functions. We fix a signature
Σ and a Σ-theory T ; a T -partition is a finite set κ1(x), . . . , κn(x) of quantifier-free formulae
such that T |= ∀x∨ni=1 κi(x) and T |= ∧i 6=j ∀x¬(κi(x) ∧ κj(x)). Given such a T -partition
κ1(x), . . . , κn(x) together with Σ-terms t1(x), . . . , tn(x) (all of the same target sort), a case-
definable extension is the Σ′-theory T ′, where Σ′ = Σ∪{F}, with F a “fresh” function symbol
(i.e., F 6∈ Σ)6, and T ′ = T ∪ ⋃ni=1{∀x (κi(x) → F (x) = ti(x))}. Intuitively, F represents a
case-defined function, which can be reformulated using nested if-then-else expressions and can
be written as F (x) := case of {κ1(x) : t1; · · · ;κn(x) : tn}. By abuse of notation, we identify
T with any of its case-definable extensions T ′. In fact, it is easy to produce from a Σ′-formula
φ′ a Σ-formula φ equivalent to φ′ in all models of T ′: just remove (in the appropriate order)
every occurrence F (v) of the new symbol F in an atomic formula A, by replacing A with∨n
i=1(κi(v) ∧A(ti(v))).
Secondly, he lambda-abstraction definitions in (4) will make the proof of Lemma A.1 below
smooth. Recall that an expression like
b = λy.F (y, z)
can be seen as a mere abbreviation of ∀y b(y) = F (y, z). However, the use of such abbreviation
makes clear that, e.g., a formula like
∃b (b = λy.F (y, z) ∧ φ(z, b))
is equivalent to
φ(z, λy.F (y, z)/b) . (14)
Since our φ(z, b) is in fact a first-order formula, our b can occur in it only in terms like b(t),
so that in (14) all occurrences of λ can be eliminated by the so-called β-conversion: replace
λyF (y, z)(t) by F (t, z). Thus, in the end, either we use definable extensions or definitions via
lambda abstractions, the formulae we manipulate can always be converted into plain first-order
formulae.
Lemma A.1. The preimage of a state formula is logically equivalent to a state formula.
Proof. We manipulate the formula
∃x′ ∃a′ (τ(x, a, x′, a′) ∧ ∃e φ(e, x′, a′)) (15)
6Arity and source/target sorts for F can be deduced from the context (considering that everything is
well-typed).
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up to logical equivalence, where τ is given by7
∃e0
(
γ(e0, x, a) ∧ x′ = F (e0, x, a) ∧ a′ = λy.G(y, e0, x, a)
)
(16)
where e, e0 are variables of index type (here we used plain equality for conjunctions of equali-
ties, e.g. x′ = F (e0, x, a) stands for
∧
i x
′
i = Fi(e, x, a)). Repeated substitutions show that (15)
is equivalent to
∃e ∃e0
(
γ(e0, x, a) ∧ φ(e, F (e0, x, a)/x′, λy.G(y, e0, x, a)/a′)
)
(17)
which is a state formula.
We underline that Lemmas A.1 gives an explicit effective procedure for computing preim-
ages. At this point, the only formulae we need to test for satisfiability in lines 2 and 3 of the
backward reachability algorithm are the ∃∀-formulae introduced below.
Let us call ∃∀-formulae the formulae of the kind
∃e ∀i φ(e, i, x, a) (18)
where the variables e, i are variables whose sort is of index type and φ is quantifier-free. The
crucial point for the following lemma to hold is that the universally quantified variables in
∃∀-formulae are all of index type:
Lemma A.2. The satisfiability of a ∃∀-formula in a model of an AB-PMAS is decidable.
Proof. First of all, notice that a ∃∀-formula (18) is equivalent to a disjunction of formulae of
the kind
∃e (AllDiff(e) ∧ ∀i φ(e, i, x, a)) (19)
where AllDiff(e) says that any two variables of the same sort from the e are distinct (to this
aim, it is sufficient to guess a partition and to keep, via a substitution, only one element for
each equivalence class).8 So we can freely assume that ∃∀-formulae are all of the kind (19).
Let us consider now the set of all (sort-matching) substitutions σ mapping the i to the e.
The formula (19) is satisfiable in a model of the AB-PMAS iff so it is the formula
∃e (AllDiff(e) ∧
∧
σ
φ(e, iσ, x, a)) (20)
(here iσ means the componentwise application of σ to the i): this is because, if (20) is
satisfiable in a structure M, then we can take as M′ the same Σ-structure as M, but with
the interpretation of the index sorts restricted only to the elements named by the e and get in
this way thatM′ satisfies (19). Thus, we can freely concentrate on the satisfiability problem
of formulae of the kind (20) only.
Now, the only atoms occurring in the subformula φ(e, iσ, x, a)) of (20) whose argument
terms are terms of index sorts are of the kind es = ej , so all such atoms can be replaced either
by > or by ⊥ (depending on whether we have s = j or not). So we can assume that there
7Actually, τ is a disjunction of such formulae, but it easily seen that disjunction can be accommodated by
moving existential quantifiers back-and-forth through them.
8In the MCMT implementation, state formulae are always maintained so that all existential variables
occurring in them are differentiated and there is no need of this expensive computation step.
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are no such atoms in φ(e, iσ, x, a)) and as a result, the variables e can only occur there as
arguments of the a.
Let now a[e] be the tuple of the terms among the terms of the kind aj [es] which are well-
typed. Since in (20) the e can only occur as arguments of array varables, as observed above,
the formula (20) is in fact of the kind
∃e (AllDiff(e) ∧ ψ(x, a[e]/z)) (21)
where ψ(x, z) is a quantifier-free Σ-formula and ψ(x, a[e]/z) is obtained from ψ by replacing
the variables z by the terms a[e] (notice that the z are of element sorts).
It is now evident that (21) is satisfiable in a model of the AB-PMAS iff the formula
ψ(x, z) (22)
is satisfiable in Σ-structure M. In fact, if we are given a Σ-structure M and an assignment
satisfying (22), we can easily expandM to a model of the AB-PMAS by taking the e’s them-
selves as the elements of the interpretation of the index sorts; in the so-expanded structure,
we can interpret the array variables a by taking the a[e] to be the elements assigned to the z
in the satisfying assignment for (22).
The satisfiability of (22) in a Σ-structure M is clearly decidable (since the constraint
satisfiability problem for EUF is decidable).
The instantiation algorithm of Lemma A.2 can be used to discharge the satisfiability tests
in lines 2 and 3 of the algorithm described in Figure 1, because the conjunction of a state
formula and of the negation of a state formula is a ∃∀-formula (notice that ι is itself the
negation of a state formula, according to the format of the initial formula).
Theorem 5.4 Backward search for the safety problem is sound and complete for interleaved
AB-PMASs.
Proof. Recall that an AB-PMAS ab(M) is safe w.r.t υ iff there is no interpretation I0
of relations, no k ≥ 0 and no possible assignment to the individual and array variables
x0, a0, . . . , xk, ak such that the formula (5)
ι(x0, a0) ∧ τ(x0, a0, x1, a1) ∧ · · · ∧ τ(xk−1, ak−1, xk, ak) ∧ υ(xk, ak)
is valid in any model N of ab(M).
Hence, ab(M) is unsafe iff for some n, the formula (5) is satisfiable in a N of ab(M). Thus,
we shall concentrate on satisfiability in models of ab(M) in order to prove the Theorem.
First of all, let us call Bn (resp. φn), with n ≥ 0, the status of the variable B (resp. φ) after
n executions in Line 4 (resp. Line 5) of the backward search algorithm (n = 0 corresponds to
the status of the variables in Line 1). Notice also that we have
T |= φj+1 ↔ Pre(τ, φj) (23)
for all j and that
T |= Bn ↔
∨
0≤j<n
φj (24)
is an invariant of the algorithm.
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Now, the formula (5) is satisfiable in a model N under a suitable assignment iff the formula
ι(x0, a0) ∧ ∃a1∃x1(τ(x0, a0, x1, a1) ∧ · · ·
· · · ∧ ∃ak∃xk(τ(xk−1, ak−1, xk, ak) ∧ υ(xk, ak)) · · · )
is satisfiable in N under a suitable assignment; by Lemma A.1, the latter is equivalent to a
formula of the kind
ι(x, a) ∧ ∃e φ(e, x, a) (25)
where ∃e φ(e, x, a) is a state formula (thus φ is quantifier-free and the e are variables of
index sorts - we renamed x0, a0 as x, a). However the satisfiability of (25) is the same as the
satisfiability of ∃e (ι(x, a)∧φ(e, x, a)); the latter, in view of the structure of the initial formula,
is a ∃∀-formula and so Lemma A.2 applies and shows that its satisfiability in a model of the
AB-PMAS is decidable. The satisfiability of (5) is clearly equivalent to the satisfiability of
ι∧φn: hence, the satisfiability test in Line 3 is effective thanks to the decidability guaranteed
by Lemma A.2. In addition, if the backward search algorithm terminates with an unsafe
outcome, then in view of Line 3 we clearly have that ab(M) is really unsafe.
Now consider the satisfiability test in Line 2. This is again a satisfiability test for a ∃∀-
formula, thus it is decidable because of Lemma A.2. In case of a safe outcome, we have
that T |= φn → Bn; we claim that, if we continued executing the loop of backward search
algorithm, we would nevertheless get that:
T |= Bm ↔ Bn (26)
for all m ≥ n. We justify Claim (26) below.
From T |= φn → Bn, taking into consideration that Formula (23) holds, we get T |=
φn+1 → Pre(τ,Bn). Since Pre commutes with disjunctions (i.e., Pre(τ,
∨
j φj) is logically
equivalent to
∨
j Pre(τ, φj)), we also have T |= Pre(τ,Bn)↔
∨
1≤j≤n φj by the Invariant (24)
and by Formula (23) again. By using the entailment T |= φn → Bn once more, we get T |=
φn+1 → Bn and also that T |= Bn+1 ↔ Bn, thus we finally obtain that T |= φn+1 → Bn+1.
This argument can be repeated for all m ≥ n, obtaining that T |= Bm ↔ Bn for all m ≥ n,
i.e. Claim (26).
This would entail that ι ∧ φm is always unsatisfiable (because of (24) and because ι ∧ φj
was unsatisfiable for all j < n), which is the same (as remarked above) as saying that all
formulae (5) are unsatisfiable. Thus ab(M) is safe.
To sum up, in this subsection we remarked that for the algorithm described in Figure 1,
to be effective, we need decision procedures for discharging the satisfiability tests in Lines 2-3.
We noticed that the only formulae we need to test in these lines have a specific form (i.e. they
are ∃∀-formulae). In the first technical lemmas (Lemmas A.1) we show that the preimage of
a state formula is again a state formula; then, in a second technical lemma (Lemma A.2), we
show that entailments between state formulae (more generally, satisfiability of formulae of the
kind ∃∀) can be decided via finite instantiation techniques. These observations make both
safety and fixpoint tests effective and constitute the skeleton of the proof of Theorem 5.4.
B Proof of Theorem 5.5
Theorem 5.4 gives a semi-decision procedure for unsafety: if the system is unsafe, the proce-
dure discovers it, but if the system is safe, the procedure (still correct) may not terminate.
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Termination is much more difficult to achieve. We present a termination result for PMASs,
obtained via the use of well quasi-orders: the syntactic condition that guarantees termina-
tion was introduced in [19], but the result we provide in this paper is novel, since it applies
to a different class of array-based systems. The strategy for proving termination consists of
isolating sufficient conditions that imply that the embeddability relation between models is a
well-quasi-ordering.
Before stating and proving Theorem 5.5, we need to recall some basic facts about well-
quasi-orders. Recall that a well-quasi-order (wqo) is a set W endowed with a reflexive-
transitive relation ≤ having the following property: for every infinite succession
w0, w1, . . . , wi, . . .
of elements from W there are i, j such that i < j and wi ≤ wj The fundamental result about
wqo’s that we are going to use in this section is the following theorem, known as Dickson’s
Lemma:
Theorem B.1. The cartesian product of k-copies of N (and also of N ∪ {∞}), with compo-
nentwise ordering, is a wqo.
Let Σ˜ be Σ∪{a, x}, that is, the relational signature Σ from Section 4 expanded with unary
function symbols a (one for every array variable a) and constants x (thus, a Σ˜-structure is a
Σ-structure endowed with an assignment to x and a, which were variables and now are treated
as symbols of Σ˜). For the following, we need the following definition:
Definition B.2. A Σ˜-structure M is called cyclic9 if it is generated by a single element
e ∈ EM (called generator of M), where E is a sort of index type (i.e. e belongs to the
interpretation of a sort E of index type).
The previous definition intuitively means that all the elements of the cyclic structures are
obtained from the generator by applying the function symbols of Σ˜ to the generator.
Since Σ is relational, one can show that there are only finitely many cyclic Σ˜-structures
C1, . . . , CN up to isomorphism. With a Σ˜-structure M we associate the tuple of numbers
k1(M), . . . , kN (M) ∈ N ∪ {∞} counting the numbers of elements generating (as singletons)
cyclic substructures isomorphic to C1, . . . , CN , respectively.
Now, we show that, if the tuple associated withM is component-wise bigger than the one
associated with N , thenM satisfies all the local formulae satisfied by N .
Lemma B.1. LetM,N be Σ˜-structures. If the inequalities
k1(M) ≤ k1(N ), . . . , kN (M) ≤ kN (N )
hold, then all local formulae true inM are also true in N .
Proof. Notice that local formulae (viewed in Σ˜) are sentences, because they do not have
free variable occurrences - the a, x are now constant function symbols and individual con-
stants, respectively. The proof of the lemma is fairly obvious: notice that, once we as-
signed some α(ei) in M to the variable ei, the truth of a formula like φ(ei, x, a) under
such an assignment depends only on the Σ˜-substructure generated by α(ei), because φ is
9This notion comes from the universal algebra terminology.
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quantifier-free and ei is the only Σ˜-variable occurring in it. In fact, if a local state formula
∃e1 · · · ∃ek
(
δ(e1, . . . , ek) ∧
∧k
i=1 φi(ei, x, a)
)
is true inM, then there exist elements e¯1, · · · , e¯k
(in the interpretation of some index sorts), each of which makes φi true. Hence, φi is also true
in the corresponding cyclic structure generated by e¯i. Since k1(M) ≤ k1(N ), . . . , kN (M) ≤
kN (N ) hold, then also in N there are at least as many elements in the interpretation of
index sorts as there are in M that validate all the φi . Thus, we get that the formula
∃e1 · · · ∃ek
(
δ(e1, . . . , ek) ∧
∧k
i=1 φi(ei, x, a)
)
is true also in N , as wanted.
The structure of the previous proof follows the schema of a proof from [19], but there
is a significant difference: the decidability result in [19] is based on locality and applies to
array-based systems whose FO-signatures do not have relational symbols, whereas here our
array-based systems do have free relational symbols. This difference is reflected in the kind
of FO-formulae that are involved.
Now we are ready to prove our first termination and decidability result.
Theorem 5.5 BReach(ab(M), ψgoal ) always terminates if (i) the AB-PMAS is interleaved
and (ii) its transition formula τ =
∨
τˆ is a disjunction of local transition formulae and (iii)
ψgoal is local.
Proof. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that the algorithm does not terminate. Then
the fixpoint test of Line 2 fails infinitely often. Recalling that the T -equivalence of Bn and of∨
0≤k<n φk is an invariant of the algorithm (here φn, Bn are the status of the variables φ,B
after n execution of the main loop), this means that there are models
M0,M1, . . . ,Mj , . . .
such that for all j, we have thatMj |= φj andMj 6|= φi (all i < j). But the φj are all local
formulae, so considering the tuple of cardinals k1(Mj), . . . , kN (Mj) and Lemma B.1, we get a
contradiction, in view of Dickson’s Lemma. This is because, by Dickson’s Lemma, (N∪{∞})N
is a wqo, so there exist i, j such that i < j and k1(Mi) ≤ k1(Mj), . . . , kN (Mi) ≤ kN (Mj).
Using Lemma B.1, we get that φi, which is local and true inMi, is also true inMj , which is
a contradiction.
42
